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NOTES
The Insurance Salesman-A New Duty to the
Insured?
In a recent decision' the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii introduced its opinion by asking, "Is the purchase of $150,000
of life insurance a 'do-it-yourself' project?" 2 In answering that question
in the negative the court laid the foundation for a re-evaluation of the
duty owed by the insurance salesman to the insured.
Because the potential purchaser of insurance is frequently ignorant
of the terms, conditions, limitations, and obligations related to the insurance agreement, and because he seldom deals directly with the insurer,
he has come to rely upon the insurance salesman to provide him with
his insurance needs. Consequently, when the insured becomes dissatisfied
with the coverage provided by the insurance salesman, the courts are
called upon to determine the respective rights and duties of the parties.
The primary determinant of the rights of the insured and the duties of
the insurance salesman is the nature of the salesman-purchaser relationship.'
The courts have generally restricted the rights and duties involved to
those imposed by the normal relationship of principal-agent or purchaser-solicitor.5 However, in three recent decisionse involving the insurance salesman and the insured, the courts have determined that the
"expert" insurance salesman should be held to a higher standard of
care than that imposed in the normal principal-agent or salesman-purchaser relationship.
An evaluation of the implications and potential ramifications of
these decisions results in a conclusion that, although a new professionalclient relationship similar to that found in the traditional professions has
1. Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Hawaii), findings of fact and conclusions
of law, 162 F. Supp. 338 (D. Hawaii 1958), aff'd, Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th
Cir. 1961), rehearing denied, 300 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
2. Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Hawaii 1958).
3. See 3 COUCH, INSURANCE § 25:32, :39 (2d ed. Anderson 1960).
4. An insurance salesman may be the agent of either the insurer or the insured, and where
there is no conflict of interests he may be the agent of both. 3 COUCH, INSURANCE 5 25:39
(2d ed. Anderson 1960); 4 COUCH, INSURANCE § 26:345 (2d ed. Anderson 1960).
5. One who is acting neither for the insured nor within the authority of the insurer will be
personally answerable in an action for false pretenses. Shuff v. Life & Cas. Co. of Tenn., 164
La. 741, 114 So. 637 (1923).
6. Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961); Knox v. Anderson, supra note 1;
Steadman v. McConnell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 334, 308 P.2d 361 (1957).
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not been imposed by the courts, there is reason to believe that such a relationship may be imposed in the near future.
IMPORTANCE OF THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

In the eyes of the layman, the insurance salesman is the middleman,
representing both the insurer and the insured in procuring and effecting
a contractual agreement for insurance coverage. However, the law is
not content with such a theory of dual representation. The law of insurance, as developed by the legislative and judicial branches of government, has adhered to the principles of agency in regard to the activities
of the insurance salesman.
It is generally held that the "general agent" or person acting by
authority of an insurer is the agent of the insurer.7 On the other hand,
a "broker" or one who procures insurance coverage through several companies is usually held to be the agent of the insured.8 The primary
reason for the distinction is to bind the insurance company by the statements and contracts of its "general agent" but to protect it from being
bound by the acts of a "broker," to whom it has delegated no authority
to act on its behalf.'
Because the principal is entitled to the benefit of his agent's skill
and judgment, an agent has a duty to exhibit undivided loyalty to his
principal.' ° When the insured relies on the law of agency for his recovery or when the insurance salesman alleges the agency relationship
as a defense, the court must make a factual determination as to whether
the salesman is the agent of the insurer or the agent of the insured."
AGENT OF THE INSURED

The agreement by which the potential purchaser selects an insurance
salesman to represent him is essentially contractual.'" Frequently this
agreement is oral. 3 Moreover, it has been held that the agency relation3 CoucH, INSURANCE 5 26:1-:2 (2d ed. Anderson 1960).
8. An insurance salesman may become the agent of the insured by express contract, implication, custom or course of dealings, estoppel, or ratification. 3 COUCH, INSURANCE 55
25:1-:6 (2d ed. Anderson 1960).
9. 16 APPL MAN, INSURANCE § 8725 (1944).
10. See 3 COUCH, INSURANCE § 25:39 (2d ed. Anderson 1960); MEcHEM, AGENCY 5

7.

500 (4th ed. 1952).
11. See Jonas v. Bank of Kodiak, 162 F. Supp. 751 (D. Alaska 1958); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Bock, 340 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). In both cases the factual determination of
whose agent was the salesman resulted in non-liability for the insurance company.
12. See note 8 sapra.
13. See, e.g., Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App. 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1955); White v.
Calley, 67 N.M. 343, 355 P.2d 280 (1960); Hamacher v. Tumy, 222 Ore. 341, 352 P.2d 493

(1960).
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ship may be created by implication 4 as well as by express agreement.
Thus, an insurance salesman may become the agent of the insured with
little difficulty.
Standardof Care of the OrdinaryAgent of the Insured
As a rule, by accepting employment with full knowledge of its requirements, the ordinary agent of the insured accepts the customary duty
of the normal agency relationship.' 5 This duty is that of exercising ordinary or reasonable skill and diligence in acting on behalf of and in
compliance with the instructions of the insured.' 6 By entering into this
relationship the agent of the insured does not agree that he will make no
mistakes whatever, nor does he agree to be subjected to the duty to exercise the highest degree of care.' 7
The duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care has been applied as
the standard where the agent of the insured has been sued for a failure
to procure a contract of insurance, 8 a failure to effect satisfactory terms
and coverage, 9 a failure to renew the contract of insurance,2 0 and a
failure to effect insurance coverage with a company which is both solvent
and licensed to do business in the state.2'
Though the normal agency relationship is essentially contractual, it
has been held that the insured may sue his agent either for breach of
contract or in tort for negligence in the performance of his duty.' Many
courts have recognized this distinction between the two grounds for recovery, while others have failed to make the distinction.28 One author'
14. See Barton v. Marlow, 47 N.J. Super. 255, 135 A.2d 670 (App. Div. 1957); Luther v.
Coal Operators Cas. Co., 379 Pa. 113, 108 A.2d 691 (1954).
15. In Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 880 (W.D. Wash. 1961), the court stated: "Clearly
the ordinary insurance solicitor only assumes those duties normally found in any agency relationship. In general this includes the obligation to deal with his principal in good faith and
to carry out his instructions. No affirmative duty to advise is assumed by the mere creation
of an agency relationship." However, this does not mean that the agent cannot assume additional duties either by express agreement or by holding out. McHEm, AGNcy S 524-25
(4th ed. 1952).
16. See Hamacher v. Tumy, 222 Ore. 341, 352 P.2d 493 (1960), for a discussion of the
extent of the instructions which should be given to bind the "broker."
17. See note 15 supra.
18. Altrocchi v. Hammond, 17 Ill. App. 2d 192, 149 N.E.2d 646 (1958); Rayden Eng'r
Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 NXE.2d 57 (1958).
19. Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal. App. 16, 22 P.2d 35 (1933); White v. Calley,
67 N.M. 343, 355 P.2d 280 (1960).
20. Barton v. Marlow, 47 N.J. Super. 255, 135 A.2d 670 (App. Div. 1957).
21. Gerald v. Universal Agency, Inc., 56 N.J. Super. 362, 153 A.2d 359 (App. Div. 1959).
With regard to types of recovery by the insured from the insurance salesman, see Note, Liability of an InsuranceAgent or Broker in Procuring or MaintainingInsurance for an Owner,

12 VAND.L REV. 839 (1959).
22. Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1955); Marano v.
Sabbio, 26 N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1953).
23. See, e.g., Milliken v. Woodward, 64 NJ.L. 444, 45 Ad. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
24. PROSSER, TORTs 478-83 (2d ed. 1955).
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has attempted to distinguish between the two theories of recovery by basing the tort action on misfeasance rather than on nonfeasance. To illustrate, when the agent of the insured has expressly or impliedly contracted
with the insured to procure coverage, a failure to do so will constitute
grounds for an action in contract. On the other hand, when the agent of
the insured takes it upon himself to procure the best possible coverage
and is negligent in doing so, an action in tort will arise.
Because the courts remain confused as to whether the plaintiff is
strictly limited to one form of action 25 and to the damages arising from
that action,2 it is difficult to ascertain whether the breach of the duty
in a specific case arises from action or inaction. A positive effort should
be made by the courts to make the necessary distinction in order to
apprise both the insured and the agent of the insured of the type of
damages which will accrue from a failure to exercise ordinary care.
Standard of Care of the "Expert" Agent of the Insured
While the agent of the insured has generally been held to the standard of ordinary care, he may also be liable for a failure to utilize a special
skill which he has held himself out to possess. 7 In at least one case,
Colpe Investment Company v.Seeley & Company,2" it has been stated
that the "professional" agent of the insured should be required to exercise
the requisite skill of his alleged status and should have a knowledge of
the various companies and terms available. In the Colpe case the court
held that it was a jury question as to whether the defendant's failure to
procure the least expensive adequate coverage constituted bad faith."
In a recent case, Hardt v. Brink,0 the court held that it was the
duty of an insurance "expert" to advise the plaintiff of his potential liability under a lease and to provide him with the necessary coverage."
The court determined that the agent of the insured had an affirmative
duty to examine the lease agreement under which the plaintiff was lessee,
because:
25. Id. at 485.
26. Damages in a contract action may be limited to nominal damages for the breach, while
only proximate cause limits damages in a tort action. Id. at 484. Compare Rayden Eng'r
Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 N.E.2d 57 (1958), with Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp.
879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
27. Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961), citing MECHEM, AGENCY
§§ 524-25 (4th ed. 1952).
28. 132 Cal. App. 16, 22 P.2d 35 (1933).
29. In a similar case the same duty was recognized by the court, but the decision rendered
was contrary due to the fact that the lower rates were not available at the time of the agreement. Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash. 2d 370, 229 P.2d 542 (1951).
30. 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
31. It is doubtful that the ordinary insurance "broker" would be required to assume such
a duty.
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by his conduct and business practices defendant permitted a reasonable
inference to be drawn by his customers, such as plaintiff, that he was a
person highly skilled as an insurance advisor and that plaintiff relied
upon him as such. Under these circumstances defendant assumed a duty
to advise plaintiff as to his insurance needs in connection with his
business,m3particularly
where such needs had been brought to defendant's
2

attention

The court in Hardt v. Brink3 3 did not attempt to impose the traditional
professional's duty on the agent of the insured. However, it did state
that, as occupational groups strive toward professional recognition, the
law will impose "an even higher standard of care in the performance
of their duties."3 4
The court accepted the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness,
who stated that the prudent agent of the insured, knowing of such a lease,
would either examine it or recommend that it be examined to determine
the potential liability of the insured under the lease.35 The defendant
suggested that the duty to examine the lease was that of the insured's
attorney. The court's response to that suggestion was: "Although
this may be true it does not follow that defendant, as a skilled insurance
consultant, did not also have this responsibility."3'6 Thus, when the
agent of the insured holds himself out to be highly skilled, he assumes
the duty to perform his responsibilities with that degree of care practiced
by other highly skilled insurance salesmen in the community 37 This
standard of care would seem to be imposed whether or not he in fact
possesses an "expert" or high degree of skill.3"
Although Hardt v. Brink39 was limited to the fact situation being
adjudicated, it illustrates that the courts are ready to recognize that in
such situations a higher degree of care must be imposed to protect the
innocent insured. While the specific type of conduct which necessitates
the imposition of the higher standard of care remains a factual determination, holding oneself out to be an "expert" or "professional" through
the medium of advertising would seem to be sufficient to require such
an imposition."0
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
Id. at 881.
The testimony of this witness was the only expert testimony offered by either party.
Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 882 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
See Curran, Professional Negligence - Some General Comments, in PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE 4 (Roady & Andersen eds. 1960), where it is stated that the courts seem satisfied with the average or minimum acceptable conduct of similar professionals as the requisite
standard.
38. Curran, supra note 37, suggests that the average or minimum standard is utilized to
avoid the problem of differentiating between actual skills and the requisite duties imposed.
39. 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
40. See ibid.
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AGENT OF THE INSURER

The insurance salesman who is expressly or impliedly authorized to
represent the insurer in dealing with third persons in insurance matters
is generally termed the agent of the insurer or the "agent."'" Because
the law of agency restricts the agent's representation in a single transaction to one principal, the courts have generally held that the agent of
the insurer owes no agency duty to the insured'
For this reason there
are no cases in which the insured has recovered from the agent of the
insurer on the basis of an agency duty.
While the agent of the insurer owes no agency duty to the insured,
it would seem that he would owe the normal salesman-purchaser duty
to be honest and fair in his dealings.43 Because the insurer is secondarily
liable for the "agent's" torts and contracts falling within the scope of
the latter's authority4 4 and because the plaintiff-insured seeks to recover
from the "deeper pocket,"4 5 cases dealing with a direct recovery from
the insurance "agent" are not numerous.
However, in Knox v. Anderson ' an insured was provided with a
prosperous "agent" who was not a mere solicitor but rather an "expert"
insurance counselor. Thus, the judiciary was presented with an opportunity to re-examine the duty of an insurance salesman who is alleged to
be the agent of the insurer.
Standard of Care of the "Expert" Agent of the Insurer
In Knox v. Anderson47 the federal district court proposed two
theories upon which a recovery might be predicated against an "expert"
insurance "agent" for overselling a purchaser of life insurance. The two
theories are: (1) misrepresentation and fraud and (2) breach of a duty
to disclose resulting from a relationship of trust and confidence. 8 While
the court of appeals, in Anderson v. Knox," ultimately established liability on the sole basis of misrepresentation and fraud, the considerations of
41. 3 COUCH, INSURANCE § 26:1 (2d ed. Anderson 1960).
42. See 3 COUCH, INSURANCE § 25:40 (2d ed. Anderson 1960), for a discussion of instances in which the courts have found no conflicting interests and permitted dual representation by the insurance salesman.
43. A failure to do so might well result in an action for deceit. PROSSER, TORTS 522-23
(2d ed. 1955).
44. MEcHEM, AGENCY § 349 (4th ed. 1952).
45. Id. § 350.
46. 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Hawaii), findings of fact and conclusions of law, 162 F. Supp.
338 (D. Hawaii 1958), aff'd, Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), rehearing
denied, 300 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
47. Ibid.
48. Knox v. Anderson, 162 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. Hawaii 1958).
49. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), rehearingdenied, 300 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 915 (1962).
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both the trial and appellate courts are enlightening in regard to the
present and future status of the "agent's" duty to the insured.
Fiduciary Duty
The court of appeals in Anderson v. Knox 0 dismissed the theory of
the fiduciary duty, assuming that the plaintiff knew that he was dealing
with the agent of another party.5 Since Anderson was the agent of
the insurance company, he could not also owe the plaintiff a fiduciary
duty.
However, the court of appeals did not dismiss the theory of a fiduciary duty without further comment. As a member of the National
Association of Life Underwriters, Anderson subscribed to a code of ethics,
the preamble to which states that its members owe a high professional
duty to their clients.52 The question thus raised is whether the "agent"
who holds himself out to the public as an "expert" and who subscribes
to professional standards of conduct should be permitted to hide behind
the cloak of the agency relationship when he is accused of having
breached the standard of conduct which he has imposed upon himself.
The court of appeals recognized this problem but evidenced its desire
to leave the determination to another body by suggesting that licensing
statutes may impose upon the insurance "agent" and "broker" duties
similar to those imposed upon members of the traditional professions.5 3
Perhaps the court of appeals should have looked more carefully at
the district court's opinion, which states:
A seller might classify himself as a salesman. Yet where this subjective
classification differs greatly from representations he makes about himself
in the business community, the court will be principally concerned with
the consequences of these representations."
The district court stated further: "'Buyer beware' lingers now only
in the argument of the lawyers." 55 Under such circumstances it would
seem that the better rule would be to permit the agency defense only
when the "agent" has not caused the insured to rely on his representations of expertness.
Nevertheless, there are strong arguments in favor of the agency defense and against the imposition of a high fiduciary duty. The insurance
agent is not required to have completed any formal professional education, nor does he have the degree of discretion in determining provisions
50.

ibid.

51.

Id. at 706.

52. Id. at 706 n.4.
53. Ibid.
54. Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795, 805 (D. Hawaii 1958).
55. Id. at 806.
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and conditions of the contract which he provides, that an attorney might
have. However, the strongest argument is that the courts do not wish
to depart from the agency concepts, which have been applied to the status
of the insurance "agent" in the past. For these reasons the professional
fiduciary duty has not yet been applied to the "expert" insurance "agent."
Misrepresentationand Fraud
Although the court of appeals in Anderson v. Knox 6 did not impose
a fiduciary duty on the "agent," it did utilize an exception to the general
concepts of misrepresentation and fraud and thereby provided a higher
standard of care for the "agent."
It is well established that a salesman is bound to regard the laws relating to misrepresentation and fraud when dealing with potential purchasers.5" Under those laws the mere expression of an opinion does
not generally justify reliance by another and a subsequent recovery."s
However, an exception to this rule exists where an "expert" expresses a
dishonest opinion to one entitled to rely upon it.59
Thus, Anderson was found liable for misrepresentation and fraud
because:
With a record such as this we find it impossible to hold dearly erroneous
the finding of the trial judge that Anderson's expressed opinion of
suitability was not an honest one but was made fraudulently and with
intent to deceive; particularly because the facts dearly warrant a determination that Anderson made his representations recklessly in disregard
of whether they were true or false.6"
The reckless disregard upon which liability was predicated cannot be
disassociated from the character of the insurance "agent's" status in the
business world - that of an expert. The extent of the "expert agent's"
knowledge, either actual or as represented, would seem to be the primary
determinant of what conduct may be labeled "recdess." As in Hardt v.
Brink,6 the measuring stick should be that degree of skill and care
exercised by other "experts" in the community.
LICENSED INSURANCE SALESMAN
Because the court in Anderson v. Knox 62 suggested that the imposition of the professional fiduiciary duty on the insurance "agent" might
56. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961).
57. See PROSSER, TORTS 557 (2d ed. 1955), for a discussion of misrepresentation in sales
talk
58. PROSSER, TORTS 556 (2d ed. 1955).
59.

Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 721 (9th Cir. 1961), citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 542 (1938).
60.
61.
62.

Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 727 (9th Cir. 1961).
192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
297 F.2d 702, 706 nA (9th Cir. 1961). Compare this suggestion -with the finding of
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come from the licensing statutes, an evaluation of these statutes is in
order. Licensing statutes have been enacted partly because of a feeling
both within and without the insurance industry that the various states
should assure the public of the professional competence of the insurance
salesman.'
Many of these licensing statutes provide that their primary
purpose is to protect the interest of the insurer and the insurable interests of the public. 4
While most states provide separate statutes for the licensing of
"brokers" and for the licensing of "agents," the requirements imposed on
members of both classes are substantially the same. 5 In the light of this
similarity of requirements requisite to the procurement of a license, it is
questionable whether one class should be held to a higher standard of
conduct toward the insured. For this reason, it is submitted that the
"agent" should not be permitted to defend his questioned conduct toward
the insured by successfully asserting the agency theory.
In Anderson v.Knox" the court's reference to the possible role of
the licensing statutes in the imposition of the professional fiduciary duty
is derived from a statement in Steadman v. McConnell,"7 a decision upholding a license suspension. The Steadman case involved a fact situation very similar to the one in Knox v.Anderson.8 A portion of the
Steadman opinion reads as follows:
The appellant was an experienced expert in the field; the insured a mere
layman who was led to believe that the bank plan would meet certain
expressed objectives. Certainly the relationship was a fiduciary one in
which Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were entitled to believe appelant's material
statements.

9

(Emphasis added.)

Because the court in the Steadman case imposed a fiduciary duty on the
insurance "agent," there is reason to believe that such a duty may eventafact by the district court in Knox v. Anderson, 162 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.Hawaii 1958):
"That Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiff certain material information and facts which
were known or should have been known to Defendant and which Defendant was under a duty
to disclose to Plaintiff because of the relationship of trust and confidence which existed between Plaintiff and Defendant and the superior knowledge of Defendant... ".(Emphasis
added.)
It is submitted that the district court was prepared to impose the fiduciary duty, while
the court of appeals preferred to leave it to licensing commissions.
63.

KIMBALL, INsuRANcE AND PuBLIC POLIcY 120 (1960).

64. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065A9(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961). This statute
states that the insurance license may be revoked if the salesman "has not demonstrated trustworthiness and competency to transact business as insurance agent, broker or solicitor in such
a manner as to safeguard the public." Under this statute all three classes of salesmen are subjected to the same standard of skill and conduct.
65. Compare ANN. IND. STAT. tit. 39, § 4503 (Burns 1952), with tit. 39, 5 4603; compare
OHIO REV. CODE § 3905.01 (Supp. 1962), with § 3905.18 (Supp. 1962).
66. 297 F.2d 702, 706 nA (9th Cit. 1961).
67. 149 Cal. App.2d 334, 308 P.2d 361 (1957).
68. 159 F.Supp. 795 (D.Hawaii 1958).
69. Steadman v.McConnell, 149 Cal. App.2d 334, 340, 308 P.2d 361, 365 (1957).

